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AN ARGUMENT FOR THE ABANDONMENT
OF THE ALLEN CHARGE IN CALIFORNIA
The Allen charge, a supplemental jury instruction designed to
elicit a verdict from a deadlocked jury, was approved in 1896 by
the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. United States.' The
Supreme Court, faced with a murder case which it had reviewed
and remanded twice before, rejected eighteen new allegations of
error, affirmed the conviction, and approved use of a controversial
charge to the jury. It described the charge as
quite lengthy, and . . . in substance, that in a large propor-
tion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that
although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual
juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his
fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with
candor, and with a proper regard and deference to the opin-
ions of each other; that it was their duty to decide the case
if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen,
with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments;
that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissent-
ing juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable
one which made no impression upon the minds of so many
men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If,
upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the mi-
nority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reason-
ably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not con-
curred in by the majority.2
The Allen charge was quickly adopted in many of the states
of the Union,3 often in expanded form.4 Its popularity was based
1. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
2. Id. at 501.
3. The following states adopted a similar instruction shortly after its ap-
proval by the Supreme Court: Garret v. State, 171 Ark. 297, 284 S.W. 734
(1926); Seville v. People, 65 Colo. 437, 177 P. 135 (1918); State v. Mosca, 90
Conn. 381, 97 A. 340 (1916); State v. Richardson, 137 Iowa 591, 115 N.W. 220
(1908); State v. Rieman, 118 Kan. 577, 235 P. 1050 (1925); People v. Coulon,
151 Mich. 200, 114 N.W. 1013 (1908); State v. Friend, 154 Minn. 428, 191 N.W.
926 (1923); Territory v. Donahue, 16 N.M. 17, 113 P. 601 (1911); State v.
Bolen, 142 Wash. 653, 254 P. 445 (1927); Nicholson v. State, 24 Wyo. 347, 157
P. 1013 (1916). A few of the above cited cases credit Commonwealth v. Tuey,
62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851), which approved the progenitor of the Allen charge,
as their source for the instruction.
For federal and state courts that more recently have approved use of an Allen
instruction see Annot. 100 A.L.R.2d 177-217 at § 3 (Later Case Service, Supp.
1975).
4. A common addition to the instruction was the phrase "the case must at
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upon the fact that it was an efficacious means of urging a stalemat-
ed jury to render a verdict. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
observed in 1972, "The charge is used precisely because it works,
because it can blast a verdict out of a jury otherwise unable to agree
that a person is guilty."'
The instruction appeared to be well balanced, asking only that
the jurors reconsider their views, and not that they abandon a
conscientiously held opinion. However, since only dissenting jurors
were asked to reconsider their opinions, it effectively coerced the
minority into joining the majority. The charge suggested that thedissenters should doubt the reasonableness of their belief since a
majority of equally honest and intelligent jurors had come to the
opposite conclusion. This bias has led many states subsequently to
re-examine the instruction, and since 1969 eleven jurisdictions
across the nation have discarded the Allen instruction.6
California belatedly adopted the charge in 1958, when the
court of appeal for the Third District approved an expanded
version of the Allen instruction in People v. Baumgartner.7 The
some time be decided." See, e.g., State v. Marsh, 490 P.2d 491, 260 Ore. 416(1971).
5. United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 666 (5th Cir. 1972). The FifthCircuit is not alone in this observation. Judge Phillips of the Tenth Circuit
wrote:
I know from trial court experience that the Allen instruction, whengiven, usually induces quick agreement on a verdict by the jury. How-ever its language may be safeguarded to leave each juror free to exercisehis independent judgment, there will be instances when it will cause ajuror to surrender unwillingly his sincere and deliberately arrived at con-victions of what the verdict should be, and thus defeat the purpose ofthe constitutional requirement of a unanimous verdict in federal trial
courts. Therein lies the danger.Burrup v. United States, 371 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion)(emphasis added).
6. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United Statesv. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); UnitedStates v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969); Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831(Alas. 1971); People v. Primm, 53 I11. 2d 62, 289 N.E.2d 601 (1972); State v.White, 285 A.2d 832 (Me. 1972); State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d765 (1973); State v. Marsh, 260 Ore. 416, 490 P.2d 491 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971); State v. Ferguson, 84 S.D. 607,175 N.W.2d 57 (1970); Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14 (Wyo. 1970).The instruction also has come under criticism from commentators. See Com-
ment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the "Allen Charge",31 U. CL L. REV. 386 (1964); Comment, The Allen Charge: Dead Law A LongTime Dying, 6 U.S.F.L. REV. 326 (1972); Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy
and the Hung Jury: A Re-examination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123(1967); Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100 (1968).7. 166 Cal. App. 2d 103, 105-06, 322 P.2d 366, 368-69 (1958). The in-
struction, which is an expansion of Allen, reads as follows:In a large proportion of cases and perhaps strictly speaking, in allcases, absolute certainty cannot be attained or expected. Although theverdict to which a juror agrees must of course be his own verdict, theresult of his own convictions and not a mere acquiescence in the conclu-
sion of his or her fellows, yet, in order to bring twelve minds to a unan-
940
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first and second districts followed,8 and in 1968, in People v.
Carter,' the California Supreme Court gave tacit approval to the
charge in dictum favorably commenting on certain statements nor-
mally made in the charge. The supreme court, however, has not
specifically reviewed and approved the version of the Allen charge
first adopted in Baumgartner.
California thus stands betwixt and between, having joined
those states making use of the Allen charge, but without a clear
ruling from its highest court on the propriety of the charge. In view
of the trend against the charge, California's commitment to the
instruction seems ripe for reconsideration.
This comment will examine the four major criticisms leveled
at the charge, will detail California's position on the Allen charge,
and will conclude with an evaluation of alternative instructions.
CRITICISM OF THE ALLEN INSTRUCTION
In 1969, the Third and Seventh Circuits proscribed future use
imous result, you must examine the questions submitted to you with
candor, and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each
other. You should consider that the case must at some time be decided;
that you are selected in the same manner, and from the same source
from which any future jury must be; and there is no reason to suppose
the case will ever be submitted to twelve men or women more intelligent,
more impartial or more competent to decide it, or that more or clearer
evidence will be produced on the one side or the other. And with this
view it is your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously do
so. In order to make a decision more practicable, the law imposes the
burden of proof on one party or the other, in all cases. In the present
case, the burden of proof is upon the People of the State of California
to establish every part of it beyond a reasonable doubt; and if, in any
part of it, you are left in doubt, the defendant is entitled to the benefit
of the doubt and must be acquitted. But, in conferring together, you
ought to pay proper respect to each other's opinions, and listen, with a
disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments. And, on the one
hand, if much the larger number of your panel are for a conviction, a
dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in his or her own mind
is a reasonable one, which makes no impression upon the minds of so
many men or women, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself or
herself, and who have heard the same evidence with the same attention
with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, and under the sanction of
the same oath. And, on the other hand, if a majority are for acquittal,
the minority ought seriously to ask themselves whether they may not rea-
sonably, and ought not to doubt the correctness of a judgment, which
is not concurred in by most of those with whom they are associated; and
distrust the weight or sufficiency of that evidence which fails to carry
conviction to the minds of their fellows.
See People v. Ortega, 2 Cal. App. 3d 894, 896, 83 Cal. Rptr. 260, 267 (1969).
For restrictions on the use of the Baumgartner-Allen charge in California see note
74 infra.
8. The Baumgartner-Allen instruction was approved in People v. Ortega, 
2
Cal. App. 3d 884, 896, 83 Cal. Rptr. 260, 267 (1969) (First District), and People
v. Ozene, 27 Cal. App. 3d 905, 910-14, 104 Cal. Rptr. 170, 173-78 (1972) (Sec-
ond District), after the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Carter,
68 Cal. 2d 810, 442 P.2d 353, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1968).
9. 68 Cal. 2d 810, 817, 442 P.2d 353, 356, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (1968).
See text accompanying note 79 infra.
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of the Allen charge because of its potential for coercion, andbecause it caused administrative difficulties. 10 Two years later, in1971, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in United States
v. Thomas," found use of the charge contrary to efficient judicial
administration and prospectively forbade its use in that circuit.
These three decisions stimulated several state courts to aban-don the charge. Between 1970 and 1974, Alaska, Illinois, Michi-gan, Maine, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, andWyoming prohibited further use of the Allen charge. 2 All of thejurisdictions rejecting the Allen instruction, with the exception ofSouth Dakota, have adopted section 5.4 of the American BarAssociation's Standards Relating to Trial by Jury.Y The ABA
10. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 420 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,396 U.S. 837 (1969); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969).Each court based its action on its supervisory power. The Fioravanti court con-
cluded:
We predicate our decision on the basis of the potential for prejudice...future use [of the charge] may generate and the profound difficulty in
confining its use within just and equitable bounds.412 F.2d at 420. See also discussion note 37 infra.
11. 449 F.2d 1177, 1184-87 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
12. See note 6 supra.13. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAND-ARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (App. Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited asABA instruction], provides this illustrative model charge:The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror.In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto.Your verdict must be unanimous.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to delib-erate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so withoutviolence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case foryourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidencewith your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesi-tate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convincedit is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to theweight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellowjurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.You are not partisans. You are judges-judges of the facts. Yoursole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.The ABA instruction was adopted in its entirety by ten jurisdictions: UnitedStates v. Davis, 481 F.2d 425, 429 (4th Cir. 1973) (as an alternative instruction);United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United Statesv. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 420 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969)(court replaced the Allen charge with the instruction specified in W. MATHES &E. DEvrrr, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE INSTRUCTIONS § 79.01 (1965 ed.) which isidentical to the ABA instruction); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7thCir. 1969); Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831 (Alas. 1971); People v. Primm, 53 Il.2d 62, 289 N.E.2d 601 (1972); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, - Mass. -, 300N.E.2d 192, 202 (1973) (as an alternative instruction); State v. Martin, 297Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1972); State v. Marsh, 260 Ore. 416, 490 P.2d 491(1971); Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14 (Wyo. 1970).In United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1973), the First Circuitexpanded the ABA instruction and approved an illustrative version for use as a
supplemental instruction.
The South Dakota Supreme Court indicated disapproval of all verdict-urginginstructions in State v. Ferguson, 84 S.D. 607, 175 N.W.2d 57 (1970).
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instruction reminds the jurors of their duty to deliberate conscien-
tiously, but unlike the Allen charge the instruction is directed to all
jurors, and not to the minority element alone.' 4
These courts relied upon four principal reasons for rejecting
the Allen instruction. Their chief bases for rejection are first, that
the instruction is potentially coercive; second, that it results in
inefficient judicial administration; third, but less compelling in
their view, that the charge is possibly unconstitutional; and fourth,
that the commonly included phrase "this case must be decided at
some time" is an inaccurate statement of law.
The Allen Charge is Potentially Coercive
By far the most frequent complaint is the potential the Allen
charge carries for coercion of the minority jurors. 5 This danger
derives from the following language found, for example, in the
California version of the charge:
[A] dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in
his or her own mind is a reasonable one, which makes no im-
pression upon the minds of so many men or women equally
honest, equally intelligent with himself or herself and who
have heard the same evidence with the same attention and
with an equal desire to arrive at the truth and under the sanc-
tion of the same oath. . . . And the minority ought seri-
ously to ask themselves whether they may not reasonably and
ought not to doubt the correctness of a judgment, which is
not concurred in by most of those with whom they are asso-
ciated and distrust the weight or sufficiency of that evidence
which fails to carry conviction to the minds of their fellows
16
14. See note 13 supra.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 836, 841 (Alas. 1971).
The Fields court stated:
We hold that the traditional Allen type charge, by virtue of empha-
sizing the duty of the minority jurors to reconsider their views without a
like admonition to the majority, is so inherently fraught with coercive
tendencies that its use cannot be justified.
487 P.2d at 836.
16. People v. Baumgartner, 166 Cal. App. 2d 103, 106, 332 P.2d 336, 369
(1958) (emphasis added).
Massachusetts, which generally is recognized as having developed the instruc-
tion from which the Allen charge was derived, see Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62
Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851), has excised from the Allen charge the language re-
ferring to minority-majority jurors. Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, - Mass. -,
300 N.E.2d 192, 202-03 (1973). In so doing, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court stated,
[T]his court, like others, has been troubled with a number of cases ques-
tioning whether in particular circumstances the charge has not exceeded
the limit and resulted in undue coercion.
Mass. -, 300 N.E.2d at 202.
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No similar request is made of the majority jurors. Only the
minority are asked to doubt the reasonableness and correctness of
their judgment, and to look to the opposition for direction. From
this instruction, a minority juror may conclude that the judge wants
a verdict and favors the majority position; 7 and that the juror is to
base his decision not on his view of the law and evidence as
presented at trial, but upon the view favored by the majority."8
Otherwise, he may feel, a request to reconsider would be made of
the majority. These conclusions easily follow from the language of
the instruction, and, in light of the purpose of the Allen charge,
they logically should follow. 19
The instruction is intended to secure a verdict by stimulating
and shaping continued deliberations. Showing favor to one faction,
or pressuring the other, is an effective, though unfair, method of
achieving that goal.2° If the court's request for reconsideration were
directed equally to all jurors, the court would have to rely upon
their good faith efforts. But by applying pressure and indicating
preference, the court effectively injects its own interests into the
jury's deliberations. 2'
17. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found this to be the basic defect in
the instruction:
Thus is revealed the very real treachery of the Allen Charge. It con-
tains no admonition that the majority reexamine its position; it cautions
only the minority to see the error of its ways.
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
387 (1969). The Illinois Court of Appeal viewed the instruction similarly.
By our interpretation, this [failure to instruct the majority to reconsider]
is in effect a tacit suggestion to the unsophisticated members of the jury
that the charge is addressed to the minority alone, the connotation being
that the views of the majority are correct and should be regarded with
deference simply because they prevail in number,
People v. Richards, 95 I1. App. 2d 430, -, 237 N.E.2d 848, 852 (1968).
18. The Montana Supreme Court, when abandoning the Allen charge, found
that
the inevitable effect of the instruction would be to suggest to the minor-
ity members of the jury that they ought to surrender their own convic-
tions and follow the majority.
State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, -, 353 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1960); see State v.
Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973).
19. The instruction causes the jury to
depart from the sole legitimate purpose of a jury, to bring back a verdiclt
based on the law and the evidence received in open court and substitutes
therefor, a direction that they be influenced by some sort of Gallup Poll
conducted in the deliberation room.
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
387 (1969). This direction violates the rule set forth in Brasfield v. United
States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926), that every consideration other than that of the
evidence and the law should be kept out of the jury's deliberations.
20. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
21. See text accompanying note 23 infra. In a dissenting opinion in Huff-
man v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962), Judge Brown remarked
that the Allen instruction results in "an intrusion by the Judge into the exclusive
domain of fact finding by the jury."
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Judge Coleman, in a concurring opinion in Thaggard v.
United States,22 candidly commented upon this problem:
[E]very juror, not being trained in the law, understands from
the Allen charge that what the judge wants is a verdict. So,
there the previously reluctant juror stands, fancying himself
in opposition to the wishes of a United States Judge, which
is about the last position in which he ever wanted to find him-
self.23
This coercive impact also was noted by the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals in United States v. Thomas.14  The court
emphatically stated that a defendant in a criminal case has a right
to a unanimous determination of his guilt or innocence by a jury;
that any intrusion into this exclusive province of the jury is error of
the first magnitude; and that the jury's province is invaded and
unanimity destroyed when the court's urging causes a juror to
surrender a conscientiously held opinion.2 5
Similarly, to focus the attention of the jury on the jury ballot
is equally destructive of conscientious deliberation.26 The minority
juror is instructed that honest and intelligent jurors make up the
majority position and that he should distrust any evidence not
found convincing by the majority.17 The majority jurors are not
asked to reconsider their judgment, and their views receive rein-
forcement from this judicial silence.2 a
The minority juror feels pressured by the judge, who has
made it obvious that he wishes a verdict, and by the majority, who
can point to the instruction for tacit approval of their position and
of their efforts to attain unanimity. 9  The logical result of this
pressure, given time, is that the minority will accept the views of
the majority.30 This would appear to be especially likely when the
minority consists of only a few jurors.
The Allen charge, however, not only causes problems for the
minority jurors trying to reach a conscientious verdict, but, as the
following discussion will show, it also creates difficulties for the
appellate courts.
22. 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
23. Id. at 741.
24. 449 F.2d 1177, 1184-87 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
25. Id. at 1181.
26. See People v. Richards, 95 Ill. App. 2d 430, 237 N.E.2d 848 (1968), and
note 19 supra.
27. See instruction note 7 supra.
28. See, e.g., Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 841 (Alas. 1971) (Allen charge
encourages majority inaction); State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765
(1973).
29. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
30. See note 18 supra.
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The Allen Instruction is Judicially Inefficient
One of the greatest problems presented by the Allen instruc-
tion is the sheer number and complexity of the appeals generated
by its use.a The District of Columbia Circuit and the state courts
of Arizona, Maine, Oregon and Wyoming have stated explicitly
that their decisions to abandon the instruction were based upon this
defect.3 " The Third Circuit stressed the same concern and by impli-
cation based its decision on the instruction's inefficiency. 3  Judge
Wisdom, in a dissenting opinion in Andrew v. United States, noted
that the Allen charge's "time saving merits in the District Court are
more than nullified by the complications it causes on
appeal." , 4
These appellate courts recognized that the instruction invites
appeal because lack of uniformity in the text and delivery of the
complex instruction furnishes an additional ground for allegations
of coercion. 35 Since the Allen instruction at best falls just short of
being coercive, almost any change in its form requires specificjudicial review.3 6 As a result, the appellate courts are forced to
examine each permutation of the original Allen instruction in the
context of the particular facts of each case.37
31. The Thomas court indicated that its decision to abandon the instruction
was based in part upon
the volume and complexity of litigation generated by the Allen charge.
[ . . (Ilts continued unrestricted use is incompatible with sound judicial
administration.
United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In addition,
see Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962).
32. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1971); State
v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959); State v. White, 285 A.2d 832
(Me. 1972); State v. Marsh, 260 Ore. 416, 490 P.2d 491 (1971); Elmer v. State,
463 P.2d 14 (Wyo. 1970).
33. See note 35 infra.
34. Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962).
35. In United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 419-20 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 387 (1969), the Third Circuit observed,
[W]e know from experience in this circuit and from an examination of
the experience in others that the use of the Allen Charge is an invitation
for perennial appellate review.
The District of Columbia Circuit court concluded, after examining the prob-
lems caused by the Allen instruction, that
the drain on appellate resources made by Allen-charge controversiesleads us to focus upon means whereby the seemingly inevitable aberra-
tions of the charge can be reduced or eradicated.
United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
36. Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 837 n.9 (Alas. 1971); see United States
v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
37. See, e.g., People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 817, 442 P.2d 353, 358, 69
Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (1968); People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 356, 359 P.2d 433,
447, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65, 79 (1961); People v. Ozene, 27 Cal. App. 3d 905, 914,
104 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (1972).
The test for coercion is whether the instruction and the remarks of the court,
THE ALLEN RULE
Most of the federal circuits have recognized this problem"8
and have attempted to correct it by finding a judge in error
whenever he strays from the approved language.39 Chief Justice
Burger, writing while Circuit Judge of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, vented his exasperation in Fulwood v. United
States:
While we have considered the slight variations in the Al-
len charge and found them nonprejudicial and noncoercive,
we note that considerable work for this court would be elimi-
nated if District Judges would consistently use a form of in-
struction plainly within Allen.
40
The District of Columbia Circuit eventually concluded that these
variations were "inevitable aberrations," necessitating elimination
of the entire instruction in order to end the drain upon appellate
resources.
4 1
In an attempt to remedy this problem, eight of the jurisdic-
tions which have discarded the Allen instruction have replaced it
with an instruction recommended by the ABA Project On Mini-
mum Standards for Criminal Justice.42 Unfortunately, the problem
of variations was not to be so easily solved. Faced once again with
an appeal based, on a trial court's improvisation, the Seventh
Circuit explicitly set forth the only version of the ABA instruction
that it would permit.43
Since the entire purpose of the Allen instruction is to conserve
judicial time and energy, it is ironic that the instruction should
founder because of its own wastefulness.
viewed in the totality of the circumstances, operated to displace the independent
judgment of the jury in favor of compromise and expediency. People v. Ozene,
27 Cal. App. 3d 905, 913, 104 Cal. Rptr. 170, 175 (1972). A not unfair evalu-
ation of this standard is that its vagueness adds to the complexity of the review.
The Seventh Circuit described this test as "question begging." United States v.
Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969).
38. See United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1972).
39. See United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (Ist Cir. 1971); Goff
v. United States, 446 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Harris, 391
F.2d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780, 782-84
(2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961); Chicago
& E.I. Ry. v. Sellers, 5 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1925).
40. 369 F.2d 960, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
41. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see note
35 supra.
42. See note 13 supra.
43. United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973). The court quoted
the ABA instruction verbatim and warned that if
a supplemental instruction relating to a deadlock is given other than in
the above form, a resulting conviction will be reversed and remanded for
a new trial.
Id. at 883.
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The Allen Charge is Unconstitutional
A third criticism of the instruction often raised by a defendant
on appeal is that it unconstitutionally forces the jurors 'to consider
matters other than the evidence and the law, and thus it deprives
the defendant of trial by an impartial jury." It is understandable,
if undesirable, that the Allen instruction, should cause confusion and
difficulty on this issue. The charge, which is the most extreme
measure a judge properly may use in urging a verdict,45 easily slips
from "instruction" into "coercion." Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court said in Jenkins v. United States, "[T]he principle
that jurors may not be coerced into surrendering views conscien-
tiously held is so clear as to require no elaboration."40
Whether coercion actually occurred, however, is not so easily
determined. Because the test for coercion is vague,47 trial and
appellate courts have had difficulty in determining whether a state-
ment from the bench was coercive, or merely proper guidance. 48
The Supreme Court of Alaska, in prohibiting the Allen instruction,
stated:
When the coercive impact of a questionable practice cannot
be assessed accurately, pragmatic concern for defendants'
rights, impartial trial and the integrity of the jury process dic-
tates that the use of a questionable charge be proscribed.
There is danger that where proof of prejudice is difficult, a
defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury will be
violated with a consequent denial of due process.49
Other courts have discussed a possible violation of the sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury trial in terms of the emphas-
is placed on the jury balloting in the Allen instruction.5"
No court, however, has gone so far as to declare the instruc-
44. See note 19 supra.
45. Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831 (Alas. 1971).
46. 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965). For similar statements, see Brasfield v.
United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926), and cases cited note 15 supra.
47. See note 37 supra.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971);United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969); Fields v. State, 487 P.2d
831 (Alas. 1971); State v. Marsh, 260 Ore. 416, 490 P.2d 491 (1971).
49. Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 839 (Alas. 1971).50. In Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926), the SupremeCourt, acting in its supervisory role, proscribed judicial inquiry into the numerical
division of a jury:
It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, seri-
ous although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury, from
whose deliberations every consideration other than that of the evidence
and the law as expounded in a proper charge, should be excluded.See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416-17 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 837 (1969); Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 837-39 (Alas. 1971).
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tion, or any part of it, unconstitutional.5 Perhaps because the
United States Supreme Court has refused to hear any cases based
on the coercive nature of the Allen instruction, courts not fully
convinced of the unconstitutionality of the instruction have elimi-
nated its use on grounds that it is potentially coercive and contrary
to efficient judicial administration,52 and have based their decisions
on their supervisory power to regulate judicial process. 3
The Allen Charge Inaccurately States the Law
A fourth, though somewhat less significant, complaint regis-
tered against the instruction is that it is inaccurate to instruct the
jury that a case must be decided at some time. 4 Since the Supreme
Court in Jenkins held reversible error a judge's instruction that the
jury must reach a verdict,55 at least one judge has argued that
Jenkins requires reversal of any conviction influenced by such a
statement.56 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts par-
tially reformed the original instruction that had served as a model
for the Allen charge, by striking the phrase "that the case must
at some time be decided" and substituting "it is desirable that the
case be decided. 57
The coercive impact of the statement -that "the case must at
some time be decided" is determined by the same vague test applied
to the other questionable portions of the instruction;58 thus, it is
understandable that courts generally have been satisfied simply to
label the phrase error.59 One might suspect, however, that the
courts' frequent disapproving references to it are prompted by con-
cern that its use is coercive. Nonetheless, whether coercive or not,
51. United States v. Bailey, 480 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1973) (concurring
opinion); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969).
52. See notes 10, 31 & 35 supra.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 387 (1969); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.
1969); People v. Primm, 53 I1. 2d 62, 289 N.E.2d 601 (1972); State v. Martin,
297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973); State v. Marsh, 260 Ore. 416, 490 P.2d
491 (1971).
54. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969); Huffman v. United
States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
55. 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965). The holding was predicated on the principle
that no juror may be coerced into surrendering a view conscientiously held.
56. In State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, -, 211 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1973), Jus-
tice Otis of the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote,
As a logical extension of that decision, there is no doctrine which re-
quires a case to be decided "at some time" since, presumably, it would
be error for any judge in any subsequent case to direct the jury to reach
a decision.
57. Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, - Mass. -, 300 N.E.2d 192, 202-03
(1973); see note 16 supra.
58. See note 37 supra.
59. See note 54 supra.
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the phrase should be eliminated for the simple reason that it is mis-
leading. ° A hung jury is a legitimate end to a jury trial, and is the
occasional inevitable result of requiring a unanimous verdict be-
yond a reasonable doubt."'
Following a hung jury and the resulting mistrial, the prosecu-
tion is forced to re-examine its case before deciding to retry the
matter. During its re-examination the prosecution may decide not
to attempt a retrial.02 Since this decision is a legitimate possibility,
the instruction that "the case must be decided at some time" is
totally inaccurate."3
THE ALLEN INSTRUCTION IN CALIFORNIA
The Allen instruction first gained appellate court approval in
California in the case of People v. Baumgartner.64  After six hours
of deliberation the foreman of the Baumgartner jury informed the
court that they were eleven for conviction. The judge then gave thejury an expanded version of the original Allen instruction. A
verdict of guilty was returned by the jury after 40 minutes of
further deliberation.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal approved the
instruction for use when a jury appears to be deadlocked, but only
if the jury could not discern from the instruction that the judgefavored one verdict over another."5 Since the judge in Baumgartner
gave the instruction after learning of the jury's position on the issue
of guilt, the appellate court concluded that the jury saw this as an
indication of the judge's belief that a guilty verdict should be
returned."0 The verdict, therefore, was reversed, and use of the
Allen instruction under such circumstances was found to be preju-
dicial error. "7
After quoting the portion of the Allen charge which suggests
that the minority jurors should doubt the reasonableness of their
opinion, the Baumgartner court observed:
60. The Supreme Court did not approve the phrase in the original Allen
charge. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896); United States v.Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187 n.71 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and text accompanying note
2 supra.
61. Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 837 (Alas. 1971).62. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
63. By defining "decided" so that it includes a decision by the prosecutor notto retry the case after a mistrial there would be no untruth. However, the jury,
sitting as the decision-maker, most probably would conclude that the case will be
re-tried until some jury does reach a unanimous verdict.
64. 166 Cal. App. 2d 103, 108, 332 P.2d 366, 369 (1958).
65. Id. at 106-07, 332 P.2d at 369.
66. Id. at 107, 332 P.2d at 369-70.
67. Id. at 109, 332 P.2d at 370.
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These admonitions must have appeared to the hold-out juror,
and to the others for that matter, to have been leveled at him.
There was an implication that in achieving that hold-out sta-
tus the recalcitrant juror had not paid proper respect to the
opinions of the others, had not listened to their arguments
with a disposition to be convinced, and that he ought to have
done so. Under the circumstances, the 11 might well have
returned to the jury room, not minded to reason further with,
but to attack, the recalcitrant one.68
However, the court ruled that the instruction itself was proper.
In its view, the coercion occurred because the jury knew the judge
knew their position on the issue of guilt; but the danger the court
described is present even when the judge is without this knowledge.
It is not -the judge's knowledge of the jury's position on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant that causes coercion of the minority
jurors, but the instruction itself. The "implication" that the minority
has not listened with proper respect to the majority is inherent in
the charge, not in the fact that the judge knows one unknown juror
is voting for acquittal and the remainder for conviction. If the
Baumgartner court had given further consideration to its own
observation, and followed it to its logical conclusion, the Allen
instruction might have made only that single, fateful appearance in
California appellate courts. Instead, like a stray cat fed once, it
continues to reappear. Since Baumgartner, use of the Allen instruc-
tion has become more prevalent, and appeals more frequent.60
Criticism of The Baumgartner-Allen Instruction
The Baumgartner instruction has been heavily criticized for
the same defects noted by courts in other jurisdictions, and because
of these defects, has been the subject of frequent appellate re-
view.7" Essentially, it instructs the minority to doubt the correct-
ness of their judgment; it directs them to reconsider their opinion
(with no admonition to the majority to do likewise); and it informs
them that the case must at some time be decided. 7 The Baumgart-
ner version is identical in all pertinent respects to the instructions
proscribed elsewhere.12
68. Id. at 108, 332 P.2d at 370.
69. See, e.g., People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 815, 819-20, 442 P.2d 353,
356, 359-60, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300, 302 (1968); People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d
328, 356, 359 P.2d 433, 447, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65, 79 (1961); People v. Ozene, 27
Cal. App. 3d 905, 913, 104 Cal. Rptr. 170, 175 (1972).
70. It made its latest appellate appearance in People v. Smith, 38 Cal. App.
3d 401, 113 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1974). The Smith court found no coercion occurred
in that the instruction was given to an evenly divided jury, and therefore no
minority existed.
71. See note 7 supra.
72. See cases cited note 6 supra.
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California courts have recognized that the instruction is not to
be given lightly.73 In making their case-by-case review, the appel-
late courts assess any embellishments added by the trial judge, the
timing of the charge, and the judge's knowledge of the jurors'
position on the issue of guilt.74
But even though the appellate courts have recognized that the
instruction has a potential for coercion, and that review of its use is
entirely dependent upon the particular facts of individual cases,
they have continued generally to approve it.75  The major reason
for this approval was described by the California Supreme Court
in People v. Carter as
the fact that the law of California, like the law of other juris-
dictions, intimately involves the court in the matter of obtain-
ing a verdict upon the evidence. Once a cause has been sub-
mitted to the jury, and absent a discharge by consent, the
court bears the statutory responsibility of assuring that a ver-
dict is rendered "unless, at the expiration of such time as the
court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is
no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. '' 76
The Carter opinion, however, merely complicated the prob-
lem. In discussing the means available to a judge to aid in securing
a verdict, the supreme court, without conferring explicit approval,
made a statement which sometimes is cited as supporting use of the
Allen charge in California.
Tacit Approval of the Baumgartner-Allen Charge by the Supreme
Court
In the nearly twenty years that the instruction has been used
in California, it has not received specific approval or disapproval
by the California Supreme Court.77 In 1968, the court considered
73. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 38 Cal. App. 3d 401, 406, 113 Cal. Rptr. 409,
413 (1974); People v. Baumgartner, 166 Cal. App. 2d 103, 106-08, 332 P.2d 366,
369-70 (1958); cf. People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 814-19, 442 P.2d 353, 356-
59, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-03 (1968).
74. These factors have been found to be coercive in certain circumstances.
People v. Crossland, 182 Cal. App. 2d 117, 5 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1960) (judge's em-
phasis on simplicity of the case could well have been interpreted by the jurors
to refer to the evidence, and thus to be an argument by the judge against the views
of the minority jurors); People v. Baumgartner, 166 Cal. App. 2d 103, 332 P.2d
366 (1958) (judge gave Allen charge when he knew the jury's numerical division
on the issue of guilt); cf. People v. Crowley, 101 Cal. App. 2d 71, 224 P.2d 748
(1950) (judge threatened to lock up the jury).
75. See text accompanying notes 69 & 73 supra.
76. 68 Cal. 2d 810, 815, 442 P.2d 353, 356, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1968),
quoting CAL. PEN. CODE § 1140 (West 1970).
77. In 1939, the California Supreme Court, in Cook v. Los Angeles Ry., 13
Cal. 2d 591, 91 P.2d 118 (1939) ruled that a "judge may not tell [the jurors]
that they must agree nor may he harry their deliberations by coercive threats or
disparaging remarks." Id. at 594, 91 P.2d at 119. The court went on to say that
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certain remarks made by a judge to an apparently deadlocked jury
in People v. Carter,7" but it ruled only that
if the court determines that a reasonable probability of agree-
ment does exist, it may, generally speaking, undertake certain
measures calculated to encourage agreement. These include
impressing the jury with the solemnity and importance of its
task and reminding it that in the event of a mistrial the case
will have to be retried, with attendant expenditure of money
and time, and decided upon similar if not identical evidence
by a jury of persons having qualifications equal to those of
the present jury.79
The Carter court conspicuously omitted from its summary of
the Allen instruction the minority-majority distinction emphasized
in Allen.80 This portion of the instruction, it should be recalled, is
responsible for most of the opposition to the charge.81 Reflection
suggests that the supreme court's failure to include this much-
criticized language in its summary is notable, and possibly inten-
tional, in light of an 1895 supreme court ruling on minority
coercion in civil trials.
The Minority-Majority Problem in Civil Cases
Although the California Supreme Court has not passed specif-
ically upon the minority-majority distinction in the Allen charge, it
has held, in a civil case, that singling out either faction in an effort
to secure a verdict is prejudicial error. In Mahoney v. San Francis-
co & San Mateo Railway,8 2 a wrongful death action, the supreme
court reversed a verdict for the plaintiff because it appeared to the
court that the trial judge had addressed his remarks to the three
minority members of the deadlocked jury only, though the entire
panel was present.8
3
a judge may "properly advise a jury of the importance of arriving at a verdict
and of the duty of individual jurors to hear and consider each other's arguments
with open minds, rather than to prevent agreement by obstinate adherence to
first impressions." Id. The court cited Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492
(1896), as support for this statement. This language, however, was dictum and
nowhere in it did the court discuss the minority-majority aspect of the Allen
charge.
78. 68 Cal. 2d 810, 442 P.2d 353, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1968).
79. Id. at 815-16, 442 P.2d at 357, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 301. In support of this
general statement, the court cited, among other decisions, People v. Baumgartner,
166 Cal. App. 2d 103, 322 P.2d 366 (1958).
80. Compare the California Supreme Court's language in Carter with the in-
struction set forth at note 7 supra.
81. See, e.g., notes 15-17 supra.
82. 110 Cal. 471, 42 P. 968 (1895), as modified, 43 P. 518 (1896).
83. Id. at 476-79, 42 P. at 968-70. Only one of the three jurors had to adopt
the majority position for the plaintiff to recover. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 613
(West 1955) (enacted 1875) provides in relevant part:
When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they may decide in
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The trial judge, upon learning that the jurors were eight to
three, told them that the trial had been expensive, that a retrial
would be necessary if no verdict were reached, and that the plain-
tiffs (a widow and six children) were not financially well off.84
The supreme court offered the following rationale for its finding
that such remarks prejudicially affected the defendant's right to a
fair trial: It will be seen that, after finding out that the jury stood
eight to three, the court called attention to the fact that all
the expense would fall on the plaintiff, who was not well off.
The judge then said: "If the jurors who cannot agree upon
a verdict differ," etc. Who were these jurors? For, evidently,
certain jurors were meant, and not all. But the judge made
this matter evident, for when a juror said: "We do not under-
stand what this gentleman wants to get at; he wanted to have
your charge reread," the court asked, "What do the other two
say about it?" Why did he not say "the other eight"; for they
were as much failing to agree as the two. Evidently, it must
have appeared to the jury that the court was insisting that
the three, or one of them, should yield to the eight, for he
proceeds to say that plaintiff requires nine jurors. He only
had eight, it seems; for why did he say plaintiff requires nine?
Why not the defendant, or why specify either party? He fi-
nally said: "I am going to send you out once more, and give
you a chance to try to agree. I think that when you appreci-
ate the circumstances and situation of the parties you will
make one more effort to do it." The affidavit shows that thejury then returned a verdict of ten thousand dollars for plain-
tiff, in from ten to twenty minutes.8 5
The fact that Mahoney was a civil action should not reduce its
significance. Although the Allen charge is used most frequently in
criminal trials, the instruction is equally effective-at least, equally
coercive-in a civil setting, and various state courts have adopted it
for use in their civil forums.86 The charge is directed at jury
Court or retire for deliberation; if they retire, they must be kept together,
in some convenient place, under charge of an officer, until at least three-
fourths of them agree upon a verdict or are discharged by the court.
84. 110 Cal. 471, 476-77, 42 P. 968, 969 (1895).
85. Id. at 479-80, 42 P. at 970 (emphasis added).
86. The instruction now given by California judges in civil cases to remind
the jurors of their duty to deliberate provides in relevant part:
Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only
after a consideration of the case with the other jurors.
You should not hesitate to change an opinion if you are convinced
it is erroneous. However, you should not be influenced to decide any
question in a particular way simply because a majority of the jurors, or
any of them favor such a decision.
BAJI No. 15.30 (5th rev. ed. 1969) (emphasis added).
For jurisdictions recently adopting the Allen charge, see Annot., 100
A.L.R.2d 177-217, at § 3 (Later Case Service, Supp. 1975).
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deadlock, and its function is not dependent on distinctions between
civil and criminal trial procedure. The Mahoney court recognized
this common denominator by focusing on the coercive impact of
the judge's plea for reconsideration, which, it ruled could be
eliminated only if the remarks were directed to all jurors.87
The Carter decision conspicuously avoided discussing this as-
pect of the Allen instruction, and it would appear that approval of
the minority-majority emphasis would be directly contrary to the
ruling in Mahoney. The Mahoney holding should have been con-
sidered in every California appellate hearing on the Allen charge,
and yet not one of them has mentioned it. ss
The fact that Mahoney was decided one year before the Allen
case requires consideration, but its pre-Allen status in no way
weakens its holding or renders it less binding on California courts.
The Supreme Court decision in Allen simply held that the instruc-
tion used by the trial court did not violate any of a defendant's
rights under the United States Constitution."9 It did not require the
instruction.9" Therefore, the California court's decision in Mahoney
was not invalidated by Allen. California could choose in 1895-as
many jurisdictions are choosing now-to proscribe use of any
language which has a coercive effect on minority jurors.
Nor has the passage of time noticeably affected the validity of
Mahoney. Mahoney has been cited in several current legal publica-
tions as standing for the rule that a court may not influence a jury's
verdict.91 It has not been cited, however, in any recent cases for its
87. Though eighty years old, the court's observations and conclusions in Ma-
honey are still valid today. No reported California decision has contradicted or
disparaged this ruling. See notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 38 Cal. App. 3d 401, 113 Cal. Rptr. 409
(1974); People v. Ortega, 2 Cal. App. 3d 884, 83 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969); People
v. Baumgartner, 166 Cal. App. 2d 103, 332 P.2d 366 (1958).
89. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 502 (1896).
90. A recent application of this principle in California is found in People v.
Brisendine, 15 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975), wherein
the California Supreme Court prohibited application of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that police officers could conduct a
search incident to a custodial arrest without violating the constitutional proscrip-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures. 414 U.S. at 236. The California
Supreme Court found that Robinson was decided
under the Supreme Court's view of the minimum standards required in
order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches. Our holding today is based exclusively on article I, section
13, of the California Constitution, which requires a more exacting stand-
ard for cases arising within this state.
13 Cal. 3d 528, 545, 531 P.2d 1099, 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326 (1975).
The California Supreme Court could also find that the Allen charge, though
valid under the United States Constitution, is unconstitutional under article I, sec-
tion 13, of the California Constitution, which provides that a defendant may not
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
91. See CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL
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ruling on coercion of minority jurors. This can be attributed to the
fact that Mahoney was a civil case and that the approved civil jury
instructions specifically instruct the jurors, on the authority of
Mahoney, not to decide a question in a particular way merely
because the majority jurors favor that decision."2
Absence of any reference to Mahoney in criminal cases is not
so easily explained. In People v. Carter, the supreme court did not
approve any language emphasizing the minority's duty to reconsi-
der, and Mahoney was not on point.9 3 In People v. Baumgartner,
the court of appeal approved the entire Allen charge, including the
minority-majority language, but never considered Mahoney. 4 How-
ever, the Baumgartner court made the same observation that Jus-
tice Temple did in Mahoney: that instructing only the minority to
reconsider would bolster the majority position and thereby place
the minority jurors at a great disadvantage.95 Unlike the Mahoney
court, the court in Baumgartner did not work out the logic of its
own observation and conclude that coercion did occur.9"
Baumgartner set a trend that other California courts consider-
ing the Allen charge have followed. No court sanctioning the use of
the charge has specifically considered it in light of the Mahoney
decision, and the supreme court's failure to do so should not be
assumed to constitute a tacit determination that the Mahoney rule
is inapplicable. The coercive language in the Allen charge is too
controversial to be approved by silence. The supreme court, if it
ever reviews the charge, should take cognizance of the holding inMahoney and state why it is or is not applicable to the language in
Allen. To continue to ignore Mahoney is to suggest that Justice
Temple's conclusion was correct and cannot justifiably be over-
ruled.
THE ALTERNATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
The ABA instruction used by ten of the eleven jurisdictions
which have abandoned the Allen charge"7 is outlined by the ABA
in its Standards Relating to Trial by Jury as follows:
PROCEDURE DURING TRIAL 445 (1960); 48 CAL. JUR. 2d, Trial § 228, at 246(1959); 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial § 257, at 3069 (2d ed. 1971).
92. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The most popular instruction is the ABA instruction. See note 13 supra.However, several states have so rephrased the Allen instruction that it is effective
without being coercive.
The instruction used in Alabama makes no reference to a minority-majority
split, nor does it direct the minority to doubt the correctness of their judgment.The instruction also includes the statement that no compromise of conscience is
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(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree
thereto; (ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one an-
other and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement,
if it can be done without violence to individual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but
only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his
fellow jurors; (iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror
should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change
his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and (v) that no juror
should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or ef-
fect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.98
Following this outline, the ABA prepared a model instruction.9"
The instruction supplied to the federal courts also conforms to this
outline. 100
While the ABA guidelines and instruction serve the same
purpose as the Allen instruction, the ABA version does not attempt
to achieve its objective by subtly chiding the minority and support-
ing the majority. Nor does it state that the case must at some time
be decided. Instead, it urges conscientious reconsideration. In
effect, the instruction reminds all the jurors that their primary duty
is to discover the truth, and not simply to return a verdict.
The ABA instruction is so worded that no pressure is directed
toward any faction or person. The highly criticized minority-major-
ity distinction made in the Allen charge has been left out, along
with the statement that the case must be decided. This has been
done without appreciably diminishing the usefulness of the instruc-
tion. Moreover, because the potential for coercion has been sub-
stantially reduced, appellate courts would no longer be required to
make a minutely detailed examination of the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding the use of the instruction in each case.
Perhaps this instruction cannot be as effective as the Allen
required. MacSwafford v. State, 46 Ala. App. 187, 239 So. 329 (1970). The
Virginia instruction is to the same effect. Poindexter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va.
212, 191 S.E.2d 200 (1972). However, it does not inform the jurors that no com-
promise of conscience is required.
The Missouri instruction states that a verdict is desirable and reminds the
jurors of the expense involved in re-trying the case. No reference is made to the
minority in any way. State v. Robins, 465 S.W.2d 560 (Mo. 1971).
Iowa uses an instruction similar to the ABA instruction. State v. Hackett,
200 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972).
Wisconsin proscribed the use of the minority-majority statements in 1941 and
its present instruction retains only a suggestion that a retrial will necessarily fol-
low a hung jury. Kelley v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 641, 187 N.W.2d 810 (1971).
98. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (App. Draft 1968).
99. See note 13 supra.
100. See 1 E. DEvrrT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE INSTRUCTIONS
§ 17.19 (2d ed. 1970).
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charge in converting a deadlocked jury into an unanimous jury,
since the potentially coercive elements are missing. However, for
that same reason, it should result in fewer appeals and fairer trials.
As between a potentially coerced verdict and a deadlock
based on the honest convictions of the jurors, it is hoped that the
latter would be preferred. A mistrial is judicially inefficient, but in-justice is hardly a fair price to pay for efficiency.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The Allen instruction's disadvantages far outweigh its advan-
tages. Conscientious jurors are intimidated by it; defendants receive
verdicts by majority rule instead of by true unanimity; and the ap-
pellate courts are burdened by the numerous appeals generated by
its application."'
Rather than adhere to a practice whose evil far exceeds its
value, the California Supreme Court should proscribe, at its earliest
opportunity, future use of the Allen charge and all its permuta-
tions. As a replacement for the charge, the supreme court could
adopt the ABA model instruction, and admonish lower courts that
no additional comments, embellishments or variations will be toler-
ated. In order to reduce further the potential for coercion of
dissenting jurors, the approved instruction should be read to thejury before it retires for deliberation, and again when the court has
reason to believe that the jurors have reached an impasse.
Since the line between proper guidance and impermissible
coercion is so finely drawn, only a set policy, firmly applied, will
keep a verdict-urging instruction non-coercive and the appellate
courts free from the need to expend increasing amounts of time
and energy attempting to supervise the dynamite charge.
Gary B. Ferguson
101. For example, the Allen instruction was recently used in the famous Little-Remiro murder trial held in Sacramento, California. The defendants were ac-
cused of the murder of Marcus Foster, superintendent of the Oakland school sys-
tem. The trial lasted nine weeks and the jury deliberated eleven days before arriv-ing at verdicts. On the eleventh day of deliberation, the foreman informed the
court that the jury had reached a verdict as to one of the defendants, but were
at an impasse as to the other. The judge then read the Baumgartner version ofthe Allen instruction to the jurors. Nine and one half hours later, the jurors
rendered guilty verdicts for both defendants. Los Angeles Times, June 10, 1975,
at 1, col. 1.
In the appeal that the defendants intend to take, it is probable that the Alleninstruction will be cited as prejudicial error, and the appellate court again will be
required to sift through the facts and circumstances surrounding its use. Thus, a
complex appeal will be made more difficult. One wonders if it is really worth it.
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